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The likelihood ratio (LR) measures the relative weight of forensic
data regarding two hypotheses. Several levels of uncertainty arise
if frequentist methods are chosen for its assessment: the assumed
population model only approximates the true one and its parame-
ters are estimated through a limited database. Moreover, it may
be wise to discard part of data, especially that only indirectly re-
lated to the hypotheses. Different reductions define different LRs.
Therefore, it is more sensible to talk about “a” LR instead of “the”
LR, and the error involved in the estimation should be quantified.
Two frequentist methods are proposed in the light of these points
for the ‘rare type match problem’, that is when a match between the
perpetrator’s and the suspect’s DNA profile, never observed before
in the database of reference, is to be evaluated.
Key words: Evidence evaluation, frequentist approach, likelihood ratio, rare type match,
uncertainty, Y chromosome STR.
1 Introduction
One of the main challenges of forensic science is to evaluate how much some evidence can
be helpful to discriminate between hypotheses of interest. For instance, a typical piece
of evidence may be a DNA trace which is found at the crime scene and whose profile
matches a known suspect’s DNA profile. A couple of mutually exclusive hypotheses is
typically defined, of the kind of ‘the crime stain came from the suspect’ (hp) and ‘the
crime stain came from an unknown donor’ (hd). The largely accepted method to perform
this evaluation is the calculation of the likelihood ratio, a statistic that expresses the relative
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plausibility of the observations under the two hypotheses (Robertson and Vignaux, 1995;
Evett and Weir, 1998; Aitken and Taroni, 2004; Balding, 2005; Steele and Balding, 2014).
The definition of the likelihood ratio depends on whether a Bayesian or a frequentist
approach is chosen. In the Bayesian context, after a couple of hypotheses is given, the
likelihood ratio is defined as
LR =
Pr(D = d | H = hp)
Pr(D = d | H = hd) , (1)
where Pr is the Bayesian probability, reflecting the expert’s belief on the joint distribution
of the random variables of the model, namely D (representing the data), H (representing
the hypotheses), and Θ (the nuisance parameter(s)).
On the other hand, in a frequentist context, the nuisance parameter θ and the hy-
potheses h are considered to be fixed (unknown) quantities. The frequentist probability
(here denoted as P∇) can be expressed in terms of the Bayesian Pr, in the following way:
P∇θ(· | h) := Pr(· | Θ = θ,H = h), ∀h. The frequentist likelihood ratio can be thus
expressed as
Lr θ =
P∇θ(D = d | hp)
P∇θ(D = d | hd) . (2)
It is important to consider that different reductions of the data D can be carried out,
each corresponding to a different frequentist likelihood ratio. Moreover, unless we choose
nonparametric solutions, a model choice is also performed, and there are often parameters
to be estimated. Hence, two further levels of uncertainty have to be added to the initial
uncertainty regarding which hypothesis is the true one.
The main aim of this paper is to provide the message that, if a frequentist approach
is chosen and an estimation is needed, (i) it is more sensible to talk about “a” likelihood
ratio instead of “the” likelihood ratio, and (ii) a quantification of the error involved in the
estimation of the likelihood ratio is to be provided along with the estimated value.
It is believed in the forensic field that the use of frequentist methods to assess the
likelihood ratio is not coherent, since the likelihood ratio has to be used within the Bayes’
theorem context, as the way to update prior odds to posterior odds. However, frequentists
may be interested as well in the likelihood ratio, seen as a tool to measure the evidential
value of data, independently of the Bayes’ theorem. Moreover, literature presents many
approaches to calculate the likelihood ratio, wrongly defined as Bayesian, which in fact
plug in Bayes estimates into a likelihood ratio defined in a frequentist way (for a discus-
sion, see Cereda, 2015). We thus believed that it is important to study and discuss the
two approaches (the Bayesian and the frequentist) separately, in order to define coherent
methodologies and avoid unnecessary hybrid methods. This is done in Section 2.
In forensic science, a very challenging problem is the so-called rare type match, the
situation in which there is a match between the characteristics of some recovered material
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and the corresponding characteristics of the control material, but these characteristics
have not been observed yet in previously collected samples (i.e., they do not occur in
any existing database of interest for the case). This constitutes a problem because of the
presence of a nuisance parameter that is (related to) the proportion of individuals (or items)
in possess of the matching characteristic in a reference population: this proportion is, in
standard frequentist practice, estimated using the relative frequency of the characteristic
in a previously collected database. Thus, in case of rare type match, there’s the need for
different solutions.
This paper discusses two frequentist methods to provide a likelihood ratio in the rare
type match case, based respectively on the parametric discrete Laplace method (Andersen
et al., 2013b), and on a generalization of the nonparametric Good-Turing estimator (Good,
1953). The latter looks similar to Brenner’s ‘κ-method’ (Brenner, 2010), but is different
inasmuch it does not need any assumption and provides two different frequencies, one for
the prosecution’s and one for the defense’s point of view. We plan to compare the two
methods in a future paper.
More specifically, these two methods are here proposed as an answer to the problem
of the rare Y-STR haplotype match: the situation in which the matching (and previously
unseen) characteristic is a Y-STR profile. Each of the two methods is analyzed in the
light of points (i) and (ii) discussed above, by carefully specifying the data reduction, the
chosen probability model, and with a discussion on the different levels of error involved in
the estimations.
Sections 3 and 4 draw out in depth the rationale behind points (i) and (ii) above,
Section 5 describes the paradigmatic example of the rare Y-STR haplotype match problem,
to which we will apply the discrete Laplace method (Section 6), and the Generalized-Good
method (Section 7) according to the guidelines exposed in the opening sections.
2 Bayesian versus frequentist approach to likelihood ratio
assessment
The task of a forensic statistician is to measure the extent to which some given data favors
one hypothesis instead of the other. For instance, the data at disposal may consist of
a DNA trace found at the crime scene which matches a suspect’s DNA profile, and of
a database of collected DNA profiles from a reference population or past cases. This is
a paradigmatic example to which, from now on, we will refer generically as “the DNA
example”. The prosecution and defense hypotheses are usually of the kind “the trace has
been left by the suspect” (hp) and “the trace has been left by an unknown person” (hd).
Denote with h ∈ {hd, hp} the unknown true hypothesis, and with θ the nuisance parameter
involved in the assessment of the likelihood ratio. In the DNA example, the vector made
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of all the DNA frequencies can be thought of as the nuisance parameter θ. Notice that
there is a difference between h and θ: one (h) is the parameter which we ‘test’ through
the likelihood ratio, the other (θ) is a nuisance parameter involved in the likelihood ratio
assessment. It is often possible to split the data D into E, evidence directly related to
the crime, and B, additional information not related to the crime and only pertaining to
the nuisance parameter θ. In the DNA example, we can take as E the couple of matching
profiles (that of the trace and that of the suspect) and as B the database of reference. D,
E, and B can be regarded as random variables, such that D = (E,B).
Bayesian and frequentist methods differ in how they consider the parameters θ and h.
In a Bayesian context they are modelled through random variables Θ and H, which are
given prior distributions p(θ) and p(h). Frequentists consider them as fixed (i.e., without
distribution) unknown quantities. Regardless of the type of approach which is chosen,
some model assumptions concerning E and B, θ and h can be made:
a. The distribution of B given h and θ, only depends on θ.
b. B is independent of E, given h and θ.
In the DNA example, condition a holds if for instance the database is collected before
the crime, since the sampling mechanism to obtain the database of reference is independent
of which hypothesis is correct. Condition b holds if the suspect has been found on the
ground of different evidence that has nothing to do with DNA.
2.1 The Bayesian approach
Θ H
EB
Figure 1: Bayesian network representing the dependency relations between E (evidence of
the case), B (background data), Θ (nuisance parameter), and H (hypotheses of interest).
A full Bayesian model is defined by giving the prior joint probability distribution for
all the random variables of the model (here E, B, H and Θ). It can be represented by
the Bayesian network of Figure 1, which is in turn equivalent to the following Bayesian
reformulation of conditions a, and b, with a third additional condition:
Bayesian a. B is conditionally independent of H given Θ.
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Bayesian b. B is conditionally independent of E given Θ and H.
Bayesian c. Θ is unconditionally independent of H.
Condition Bayesian c is guaranteed for instance if prior beliefs on θ and on h are assessed
by people with different responsibilities and tasks: a judge for h and a forensic DNA
expert (or a statistician) for θ. The joint prior can be factorized as follows, by looking at
the structure of the Bayesian network or, equivalently, using the three conditions above:
p(θ, h, b, e) = p(θ)p(h)p(b|θ)p(e|θ, h). By choosing a prior distribution for θ and h which
reflects expert’s beliefs, the Bayesian probability is an expression of the subjective credence
of the experts. The distribution of all other variables given θ and h is defined by the
structure of the model, and needs no subjective assessment.
The Bayesian likelihood ratio can be derived in the following way:
LR =
Pr(E = e,B = b | H = hp)
Pr(E = e,B = e | H = hd) =
Pr(E = e | B = b,H = hp)
Pr(E = e | B = b,H = hd) =
∫
p(e | b, hp, θ) p(θ | b, hp)dθ∫
p(e | b, hd, θ)p(θ | b, hd)dθ
=
∫
θ p(θ | b) dθ∫
θ2 p(θ | b) dθ =
E(Θ | B = b)
E(Θ2 | B = b) .
Some simplifications have been carried out because of conditions a, b, and c. Since it
is possible to marginalize out over all values of Θ, using its distribution, there’s no need
to estimate the likelihood ratio, or to account for uncertainties, if a proper full Bayesian
approach is chosen.
In the rest of the paper we only focus on frequentist methods to solve the rare Y-STR
haplotype match problem, but a companion paper presents a similar study on Bayesian
methods (Cereda, 2015).
2.2 The frequentist perspective
The difference between frequentist and Bayesian methods regards parameters h and θ: for a
frequentist they are fixed quantities, whose values correspond to, respectively, the unknown
true value of θ and the correct hypothesis. One can see frequentist models as Bayesian
models where the distributions chosen for Θ and H give probability one to values θ and h,
respectively. Also, one can express the frequentist probability Pr in terms of the Bayesian
probability Pr, in the following way: Pr (· | h) := Pr θ(· | h) = Pr(·|H = h,Θ = θ). For
frequentist statisticians, there is a true, ‘physical’ probability which governs the situation
at hand: according to the prosecution this true probability is Pr θ(· | hp), while according
to the defense it is Pr θ(· | hd), with θ set to its true (unknown) value.
Conditions a and b can be rephrased, in a frequentist language as:
Frequentist a. Pr θ(B = b | hp) = Pr θ(B = b | hd), for all θ and b.
Frequentist b. Pr θ(E = e | B = b, h) = Pr θ(E = e | h), for all θ, h, e, and b.
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It holds that:
Lr =
Pr (D = d | hp)
Pr (D = d | hd) =
Pr (E = e,B = b | hp)
Pr (E = e,B = b | hd) =
Pr (E = e | B = b, hp)
Pr (E = e | B = b, hd)
Pr (B = b | hp)
Pr (B = b | hd) .
The index θ has been omitted for ease of notation. Thanks to conditions Frequentist
a and b, the likelihood ratio can be expressed as
Lr =
Pr (E = e | hp)
Pr (E = e | hd) . (3)
Even though the two alternative ways of writing the likelihood ratio expressed by
equations (2) and (3) are theoretically different, and mean two different things, they have
the same value. This implies that part of the information, namely B, is not useful to
discriminate between the two hypotheses of interest. Stated otherwise, when knowing θ,
B is irrelevant to determine the likelihood ratio, i.e. to decide about parameter h. However,
it may play an important role in the estimation of parameter θ. For instance, getting back
to the DNA example, the database (B) is often useful to estimate the frequencies of the
different haplotypes.
Notice that, in order for (3) to hold, b can be modified to something less strong:
Frequentist b∗.
Pr θ(E = e | B = b, hp)
Pr θ(E = e | B = b, hd) =
Pr θ(E = e | hp)
Pr θ(E = e | hd) for all e, b, and θ.
which is equivalent to ask that updating the likelihood ratio for the observation of B to
take into account the observation of E, does not change anything.
Furthermore, while conditions a and b∗ imply (3), the converse is not true. Formulation
(3) is instead equivalent to a weaker condition, that is:
Frequentist c. Pr θ(B = b | E = e, hp) = Pr θ(B = b | E = e, hd), for all θ.
This can be seen by the following alternative development of the likelihood ratio (θ
omitted):
Lr =
Pr (D = d | hp)
Pr (D = d | hd) =
Pr (B = b | E = e, hp)
Pr (B = b | E = e, hd)
Pr (E = e | hp)
Pr (E = e | hd) =
Pr (E = e | hp)
Pr (E = e | hd) . (4)
It follows that:
c⇔ LR = Pr (E = e | hp)
Pr (E = e | hd) . (5)
Notice that frequentists use a likelihood ratio Lr θ, which can be written in terms of the
Bayesian LR as LR|Θ = θ (read “LR given θ”), and attempt to get close to θ by choosing
some estimator θ̂. This leads to the so-called plug-in estimator L̂r θ = Lr θ̂ = LR|(Θ = θ̂).
However, that’s not the only option, as we will see for the method explained in Section 7.
It is important to notice that the frequentist approach may be represented by the
same Bayesian network of Figure 1, where the states of nodes Θ and H are instantiated
to particular values θ and h, respectively. This shows that actually the two approaches
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don’t disagree on the structure of the model regarding E and B. Only, Bayesians add
ingredients to the model by allowing Θ and H to have a distribution. Stated otherwise,
the Bayesian approach is defined by the very same frequentist conditions a and b, with
the addition of condition c about the independence of Θ and H.
3 Data reduction
Let us denote with D all the data given to the expert in the form of a dossier, which he
has to “translate” into a well-defined mathematical object. To evaluate the entirety of
the data at the expert’s disposal is often a delusion, from which the need for a reduction
of D to something less informative, but of more feasible evaluation, which we denote as
D. Often the database contains only information about a limited number of loci, and this
implies that information about other loci of the crime stain can’t be used. This constitutes
already a first reduction of the data. Other kinds of reductions are performed in order to
gain in terms of precision of the estimates. Especially in a situation with many nuisance
parameters, it can be wise to discard the part of data which primarily tells us about
the nuisance parameters, and only indirectly about the ultimate question of interest (i.e.,
which hypothesis is more likely to be true). In fact, it could be very wise to reduce the
data D to a much smaller amount of information, because the likelihood ratio based on
the data reduction is much more precisely estimated than one based on all data. However,
there’s a limit to this: the reduction of D into D comes with a cost: the stronger the
reduction, the less the corresponding likelihood ratio value is discriminating of the two
hypotheses, because less information is less powerful to that purpose. We have to make
a compromise between a gain in terms of precision and a loss in strength of the evidence.
This will be discussed more in detail in Section 8.
Once a particular reduction D has been defined, the frequentist likelihood ratio (Lr )
can be defined as in (2). It is easy to understand that there isn’t a unique way to reduce
D and that each choice entails the definition of a different likelihood ratio. For instance,
in the DNA example, one can consider a profile made of more or fewer loci. Another
kind of reduction will be presented in Section 7. Different choices of D ( D lead to
different likelihood ratios. Therefore, it is better to refer to “a” likelihood ratio instead of
to “the” likelihood ratio. This was already stated in Dawid (2001), even though regarding
hypotheses instead of data.
In the literature different choices of D ( D and ‘Pr’ are proposed, each corresponding
to a different likelihood ratio to be estimated. These choices are often only implicit and
one of the aims of this research is to make explicit the reduction which corresponds to two
selected methods, by looking for the corresponding E and B.
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4 Different levels of uncertainty
The likelihood ratio measures the relative strength of support given by the data to a
hypothesis over an alternative. Clearly, it is useful when there is uncertainty about which
of the two hypotheses is true (to be more precise, it may also be the case that none of
the alternatives is correct, and the likelihood ratio continues to be meaningful). Along
with this first basic initial uncertainty about the state of the affairs, two more levels of
uncertainty arise in the attempt of calculating the likelihood ratio.
For a frequentist statistician, the likelihood ratio is a ratio of probabilities based usually
on a model M which is at best only a good approximation to the truth. Moreover, they
have to estimate parameters of that model by fitting it to the data in some database.
Stated otherwise, after a particular choice of what is the data D to be considered, a
population model is to be chosen and its parameters estimated using a limited sample.
Some forensic literature (Morrison, 2010; Stoel and Sjerps, 2012; Curran et al., 2002;
Curran, 2005) already pointed out the necessity for uncertainty assessment in the likelihood
ratio estimation, even though they don’t differentiate among levels. On the other hand,
for a true Bayesian statistician there’s no need for estimation, and no additional levels of
uncertainty to be added, since the definition of the Bayesian Pr already includes not only
beliefs about chances when picking people from that population, but also beliefs about
parameters of the models, and beliefs about models.
This discussion may hopefully put an end to the debate as to whether it makes sense
to talk about ‘estimation’ and ‘uncertainty assessment’ for the likelihood ratio. Stoel
and Sjerps (2012) believe that “there are strong arguments for the notion of a “true”
but unknown value of the likelihood ratio, given the relevant hypotheses and background
information, and that it is important to consider the uncertainty. Ignoring the uncertainty
can be strongly misleading”. This point of view is also shared in Sjerps et al. (2016). On
the other hand, to talk about estimation of the likelihood ratio is defined as “internally
inconsistent, and hence misconceived” by Taroni et al. (2015). Both the points of view are
correct, if correctly put into context: if a frequentist approach is chosen it is sensible to
talk about ‘estimation’ and to deal with uncertainty assessment. On the other hand, in a
full Bayesian context, they are misplaced.
Notice that Bayesianism is theoretically a very powerful interpretation of probability,
but when it comes to applying Bayesian theory for practical purposes, even the most
fervent Bayesian has to strike a balance between what is feasible and what is theoretically
right and coherent according to the Bayesian perspective. He typically chooses a particular
model as the correct one (as frequentists do), and/or he has to put convenient (rather than
realistic) prior distributions on the parameters. Hence, whether Bayesian or frequentist
approaches are chosen, the attempt to produce the likelihood ratio leads to several levels
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of uncertainty which should be accounted for.
We will now discuss the two additional levels of uncertainty mentioned before. The
second level of uncertainty pertains to the choice of a particular population model, which
is only an approximation of the truth. This level of uncertainty may be reduced using
nonparametric methods, that are based on fewer assumptions.
Given a particular population model, the third level of uncertainty pertains to the fact
that the population parameters are not known. This may involve estimation of parameters
(such as in the discrete Laplace method of Section 6) or the direct estimation of the
probabilities of interest (as in the Generalized-Good method described in Section 7) and
the quality of the estimates severely depends on the size of the available databases. This
level of uncertainty pertains both to parametric and nonparametric methods.
The evidential value reported depends on all the levels of uncertainty which afflict
the estimation of the likelihood ratio. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to report
the likelihood ratio value along with (1) an explicit definition of which data D we want to
evaluate through that likelihood ratio, and (2) a discussion (and if possible a quantification)
of the levels of uncertainty that afflict the reported value.
4.1 Estimating the weight of evidence
Instead of estimating the likelihood ratio, it is more sensible to directly estimate its loga-
rithm, sometimes called relevance ratio or weight of evidence (Good, 1950; Aitken et al.,
1998; Aitken and Taroni, 2004). This is because the interpretation of the likelihood ratio
values goes through orders of magnitude 10, and when a value is reported, it is important
to control the relative error, rather than the absolute error. In fact, the first is meaningful
in itself while the second depends on the particular value of the likelihood ratio. For the
very same reasons why the verbal equivalent scale (Aitken et al., 1998) is based on loga-
rithm. Furthermore, both the odds form of Bayes’ theorem and the formula to combine
likelihood ratios from independent pieces of evidence involve a multiplicative relationship
that becomes a handier additive relation if logarithm is taken (Schum, 1994). Moreover,
the logarithm helps in presenting large numbers in a compact way, of more easy com-
prehension, and it is symmetric with respect to prosecution’s and defense’s hypothesis:
this may be useful if one wants to invert the weight of evidence to consider the defense’s
proposition (Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
5 The rare Y-STR haplotype problem
Consider the situation in which a piece of evidence is recovered at the crime scene, and a
suspect turns out to have the same analyzed characteristics (for instance the same DNA
profile) as the crime scene evidence. The prosecution claims that the suspect left the
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evidence, defense claims that someone else (with the same DNA profile) left it. The
capability of the match to discriminate between the competing hypotheses is evaluated by
comparing how probable it is under each of the hypotheses. This depends on the proportion
of individuals in possess of the same profile in the population of possible perpetrators: the
rarer the profile the more the suspect is in trouble. This proportion is usually unknown,
the only available data being a sample of DNA profiles from the population, in the form of
a reference database. The naive estimator uses the relative frequency of the profile in the
database as an estimate for θ. Problems arise when this frequency is 0, the so-called “rare
type match”. This problem is so substantial that it has been defined “the fundamental
problem of forensic mathematics” by Brenner (2010). As an alternative to the empirical
frequency estimator, one can use the add-constant estimators, which adds a constant to
the count of each type, included the unseen ones. The most well known is the add-one
estimator, due to Laplace (1814), and the add-half estimator of Krichevsky and Trofimov
(1981). However, to use these methods one needs to know the number of possible unseen
types and there are problems if this number is large compared to the sample size (see Gale
and Church (1994) for additional discussion). Another possibility is the ‘rule of three’,
proposed by Louis (1981). It states that 3/n is a good approximation of the 95% upper
bound for the frequency, if n is the size of the database.
Of interest for this paper is the nonparametric Good-Turing estimator of Good (1953),
based on an intuition on A. M. Turing. It is an estimator for the total unobserved proba-
bility mass which is based on the proportion of singletons in the sample. For a comparison
between add one and Good-Turing estimator, see Orlitsky et al. (2003).
The naive estimator and the Good-Turing estimator are in some sense complementary
(Anevski et al., 2013): the first gives a good estimate for the observed types and the
second for the probability mass of the unobserved ones. Lastly, the high profile estimator,
introduced by Orlitsky et al. (2004), extends the tail of the naive estimator to the region
of unobserved types. This estimator has been improved by Anevski et al. (2013) that also
provides the consistency proof.
The rare type match problem is common, for instance, in case a new kind of forensic
evidence is involved, and for which the available database size is still limited. One exam-
ple is the case of DIP-STR markers (e.g. Cereda et al., 2014). The same happens when
Y-chromosome (or mitochondrial) DNA profiles are used: because of the lack of recom-
bination involved when offspring DNA is generated from the DNA of the parents, each
haplotype must be treated as a unit (the match probability can’t be obtained by multipli-
cation across loci) and the set of possible haplotypes is extremely large. As a consequence,
most of the Y-STR haplotypes are not represented in the database.
In the rest of the paper, Y-STR data will be retained as an extreme but common and
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important way in which the problem of assessing the evidential value of rare type match
can arise. Literature provides some examples of approaches to evaluate it for the rare
Y-STR haplotypes match: Egeland and Salas (2008), the κ method Brenner (2010, 2014),
the coalescent theory method (Andersen et al., 2013a), the haplotype surveying method
(Roewer et al., 2000; Krawczak, 2001; Willuweit et al., 2011), and the discrete Laplace
method (Andersen et al., 2013b) (not directly proposed for the rare haplotype case but
usable for that purpose). As already mentioned, Cereda (2015) discusses the full Bayesian
approach to this problem.
Bayesian nonparametric estimators for the probability of observing a new type have
been proposed by Tiwari and Tripathi (e.g. 1989); Lijoi et al. (e.g. 2007); Favaro et al. (e.g.
2009). However, for the likelihood ratio assessment it is required not only the probability
of observing a new species but also the probability of observing this same species twice
(according to the defense the crime stain profile and the suspect profile are two independent
observations). Cereda (2015b) is the first paper that addresses the problem of likelihood
ratio assessment in the rare haplotype case using Bayesian nonparametric models.
The present paper analyses two frequentist methods, the discrete Laplace method, and
a generalization of the Good-Turing, making explicit the corresponding definitions of D,
E, and B, and providing a study on the different levels of uncertainty arising for each.
6 The discrete Laplace Method
A discrete random variable X is said to follow the discrete Laplace distribution DL(p, y),
with dispersion parameter p ∈ (0, 1), and location parameter y ∈ Z, if its probability
density is defined as
f(x | p, y) =
(
1− p
1 + p
)
p|x−y|, ∀x ∈ Z.
This is used in Andersen et al. (2013b) to model the distribution of single locus Y-STR
haplotype in some subpopulation, which is thus assumed to be distributed around a modal
allele (represented by the location parameter y).
Each haplotype is actually composed by r loci. Let denote with X = (X1, X2, ..., Xr)
the random variable which describes an r-loci haplotype configuration. Moreover, there
may be c different subpopulations to take into consideration. By making the strong as-
sumption of independence between loci, within the same subpopulation, the following
density is used to describe the probability that X = x:
f(x | {yj}j , {pj}j) =
c∑
j=1
τj
r∏
k=1
f(xk | yjk, pjk),
where, for each j, τj is the probability a priori of generating from the jth subpopulation,
while pj = (pj1, pj2, ..., pjr) and yj = (yj1, yj2, ..., yjr) represent the dispersion and location
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parameters, respectively, of the jth subpopulation. Andersen et al. (2013b) propose to
estimate all these parameters by using using the EM algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977).
The initial subpopulation centres are chosen by PAM algorithm (Kaufman and Rousseeuw,
2009) and the number of them by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).
6.1 The choice of D in the discrete Laplace Method
The choice of D which underlies the discrete Laplace method, when used to address the
rare haplotype match problem is:
• DDL = the particular haplotype x of the suspect and of the stain, along with a
database which is a sample from the population of possible perpetrators.
This method allows one to evaluate the data in the light of the usual hypotheses of
interest in the DNA example (see Section 2). DDL can be split into EDL and BDL, in the
following way:
• EDL = the particular haplotype x of the stain (Et) and of the suspect (Es).
• BDL = random sample from the population of possible perpetrators (i.e. database).
The vector containing the frequencies of all haplotypes in the population of reference can
be thought of as the nuisance parameter θ of this model. Conditions a. and b. presented
in Section 2 are valid for EDL, BDL, θ, and h, thus the following likelihood ratio (where θ
is again omitted) corresponds to this choice of data, evidence, background, and model:
LrDL =
Pr (DDL = d | hp)
Pr (DDL = d | hd) =
Pr (Et = x | Es = x, hp)Pr (Es = x | hp)
Pr (Et = x | Es = x, hd)Pr (Es = x | hd)
=
Pr (Et = x | Es = x, hp)
Pr (Et = x | hd) =
1
fx
.
(6)
Here, fx is the frequency of the haplotype x in the population of reference. The second
equality is due to conditions a and b discussed in Section 2.2, while the fourth one is
justified by the fact that the distribution of the haplotype of the suspect does not depend
on which hypothesis is correct, and that, when θ is fixed (as in the frequentist approach
which we are considering) and under hd, Et is independent of Es. The weight of evidence
is thus
log10 LrDL = log10
1
fx
. (7)
The frequency fx can be estimated by f̂x, using the discrete Laplace method. This brings
to the following plug-in estimator for log10 LrDL:
̂log10 LrDL = log10
1
f̂x
.
12
Notice that the discrete Laplace method uses the database to estimate the number of
subpopulations and all the parameters in the model, and this is where BDL comes into
play again.
6.2 Quantifying the uncertainty of the discrete Laplace method
We quantify the uncertainty of this method comparing the distribution of ̂log10 LrDL =
log10
1
f̂x
with the distribution of the “true” log10 LrDL = log10
1
fx
. fx is not known, but
we have a database of approximately 19,000 Y-STR 23-loci profiles from 129 different
locations in 51 countries in Europe (Purps et al., 2014)1, which we can pretend contains
the whole population of interest for our case. We will consider only 7 loci out of 23 and
perform the following experiment: we sample a small database of size N = 100, along with
a new haplotype (not observed in the small database), and calculate the estimate log10
1
f̂x
.
Then, we can use the relative frequency of the haplotype x in the big database as the true
one, fx to obtain log10
1
fx
.
This process can be repeated many times (for instance M = 1000 samplings of small
databases of size N = 100 and, for each, a never observed haplotype).
In estimating log10 LrDL via f̂x, one has the choice between adding the haplotype x to
the small database before estimating parameters of the discrete Laplace distribution, or
not. In a full Bayesian approach the right thing to do is to add the profile to the database.
This is shown in Cereda (2015), and we believe that it is the good thing to do also in a
frequentist framework. In fact, experiments show that to add or not the haplotype to the
database does not make much difference.
Table 1 and Figure 2 (left part) compare the distributions of log10 Lr and ̂log10 LrDL,
using 7 loci. The same experiment has been carried out for 10 and 3 loci, but not reported
in details.
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max s.d.
log10 LrDL 1.305 2.733 3.277 3.272 3.800 4.277 0.666
̂log10 LrDL 1.432 3.441 4.061 4.114 4.750 8.452 1.017
Error eDL -1.37 0.217 0.807 0.842 1.39 4.476 0.863
Table 1: Summaries of the distribution of log10 LrDL, ̂log10 LrDL, and of the error eDL.
The error of the discrete Laplace method can be defined as eDL := ̂log10 LrDL −
log10 LrDL. It measures how much the estimated distribution differs from the true one.
Table 1 and Figure 2 (right part) show the distribution of the error. One can see that it
can attain up to about 4 orders of magnitude. The distribution of the error is mostly lo-
1A clean version of the database is provided by Mikkel Meyer Andersen (http://people.math.aau.dk/
~mikl/?p=y23).
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Figure 2: discrete Laplace method. Boxplots comparing the distributions of log10 LrDL
and ̂log10 LrDL (left) and the error eDL = ̂log10 LrDL- log10 LrDL (2nd column).
cated on positive values, which means that, more often than not, ̂log10 LrDL overestimates
log10 LrDL. The standard deviation of the error is small, thereby eDL does not move too
much away from its mean, which is about 0.842.
Motivated by the discussion of Section 4, we now analyze the different levels of un-
certainty which affect the error. The second level of uncertainty is introduced when the
discrete Laplace model, along with all its set of assumptions, is chosen to model the
distribution of single locus haplotypes, which in reality do not follow a discrete Laplace
distribution.
The third level of uncertainty pertains to the estimation of the parameters of the model
(c, p, y, τ). Here, the databases used to estimate the parameters of the discrete Laplace
model are probably too small (N = 100) with regard to 7 loci.
To decrease both sources of error, one can reduce the number of analyzed loci to 3. The
population becomes less sparse, and the databases big enough. Indeed, we performed this
experiment and the error decreased a great deal. However, the basic level of uncertainty
(see Section 4) is increased inasmuch the data becomes less effective to discern between
the two hypotheses. On the other hand, the same experiment with 10 loci leads to obtain
more powerful likelihood ratios, but less precise.
The second level of uncertainty can be made harmless assuming an infinite number of
subpopulations, since in this way the model will perfectly fit any population. However, this
solution will increase the number of parameters, along with the third level of uncertainty.
It is worth underlining that the results of our simulations do not mean that the discrete
Laplace method is wrong on the whole, but they show that a blind use of this method is
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dangerous. We are applying this method to the specific case of the rare haplotype match,
using a database of size 100, and a rather sparse population: maybe this method was never
intended to be used for such small databases, and maybe it can be modified in more clever
ways to that purpose.
7 The Generalized-Good method
Based on Good (1953), we now propose a nonparametric estimator for the weight of
evidence. This is a very good example of data reduction, since D is here reduced to a
greater extent than it was done for the discrete Laplace method. Indeed, the specific
haplotype x of the crime stain and of the suspect is ignored, retaining only the fact that
they match and the fact that this profile has not been observed yet in the database.
Stated otherwise,
• DGG = the haplotype of the suspect matches the haplotype of the crime stain and
it is not in the database.
Consider the following mathematical description: the database of size N can be seen
as an i.i.d. sample (Y1, Y2, ..., YN ) from species {1, 2, ..., S}, with probabilities (p1, p2, ...pS).
Hence, the suspect’s profile can be though of as the N + 1st i.i.d. observation. The crime
stain’s profile is the N + 2nd observation. According to the defense it is again an i.i.d.
draw from (p1, p2, ...pS), while according to prosecution it is equal to the value of YN+1,
with probability one.
The likelihood ratio for this reduction of the data can be thus written as
LrGG =
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN , YN+1 = YN+2 | hp)
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN , YN+1 = YN+2 | hd) =
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN | hp)
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN , YN+1 = YN+2 | hd) .
From now on, we are presenting results regarding a general database size N > 2, and
general random variables Y1, ..., YN , i.i.d. from (p1, p2, ..., pS). The following notation is
used:
θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) := Pr (YN /∈ {Y1, Y2, ..., YN−1}),
θ2(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) := Pr (YN /∈ {Y1, Y2, ..., YN−2}, YN = YN−1).
To make the notation less cumbersome we will use
YN := (Y1, Y2, ..., YN ),
Yi,N := (Y1, Y2, ..., Yi−1, Yi+1, ..., YN ),
Y(i,j),N := (Y1, Y2, ..., Yi−1, Yi+1, ..., Yj−1, Yj+1, ..., YN ), ∀i < j.
Moreover, for any random variable Y , and any couple of sets A and B, 1A∩Bc(Y ) is a
random variable which has value 1 if Y belongs to the set A and not to the set B, and
zero otherwise.
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Theorem 1. An unbiased estimator for θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) is θ̂1(N) = N1/N , where N1
is the number of singletons in the database.
Proof.
θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) = Pr (YN /∈ YN−1) = E(1(YN−1)c(YN )) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E(1(Yi,N )c(Yi))
= E
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(Yi,N )c(Yi)
)
= E
(
N1
N
)
,
where the last equality is due to the fact that the function 1(Yi,N )c(Yi) has value 1 for every
singleton of the database: the sum is thus the number of singletons (N1).
Theorem 2. An unbiased estimator for θ2(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) is θ̂2(N) = 2N2/N(N − 1),
where N2 is the number of doubletons in the database.
Proof.
θ2(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) = Pr (YN /∈ {YN−2}, YN = YN−1) = E(1{YN−1∩(YN−2)c}(YN ))
=
2
N(N − 1)
∑
i<j
E(1{Yj∩(Y(i,j),N )c}(Yi)) = E
 2
N(N − 1)
∑
i<j
1{Yj∩(Y(i,j),N )c}(Yi)

= E
(
2N2
N(N − 1)
)
,
where the last equality is due to the fact that the function 1{Yj∩(Y(i,j),N )c}(Yi) has value 1
for each of the N2 doubletons of the database.
The two previous theorems can be easily generalized to θm defined as θm(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) :=
Pr (YN /∈ YN−m, YN = YN−1 = .. = YN−m+1).
Now we can estimate log10 LrGG in the following way:
log10 LrGG = log10
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN | hp)
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN , YN+1 = YN+2 | hd) ≈ log10
Pr (YN /∈ YN−1)
Pr (YN /∈ YN−2, YN = YN−1)
≈ log10
θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS)
θ2(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS)
.
Thus, we propose the following estimator for the weight of evidence:
̂log10 LrGG = log10
θ̂1(N)
θ̂2(N)
= log10
(N − 1)N1
2N2
≈ log10
NN1
2N2
. (8)
Notice that there are two kinds of approximation steps: a mathematical approximation
of θ1(N + 1; p1, p2, ..., pS) with θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS), which should hardly make any differ-
ence, for reasonably large N , and a statistical estimation of θ1(N ; p1, p2, ..., pS) using an
unbiased estimator (and similarly for θ2).
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It is important to underline that, due to Jensen’s inequality, the estimators log10 θ̂1
and log10 θ̂2 are not unbiased for log10 θ1 and log10 θ2, but it will be shown by simulations
that ̂log10 LrGG is approximately unbiased for log10 LrGG. However, the point is not to
find an unbiased estimator, but one with a small error rate.
Notice that in order to estimate log10 LrGG it is not necessary to use all the information
contained in the database, but only N , N1, and N2, that is the number of singletons
and doubletons in the database. The nuisance parameter of the model is the vector θ
containing the frequencies of the Y-STR haplotypes in the population of interest. θ1 and
θ2 are functions of θ.
The limitation of this method is that it cannot be used if N2 = 0 (this corresponds to an
infinite likelihood ratio) and it does not perform well also in case the number of singletons
is very small or zero. We believe it can be improved and extended by smoothing techniques
(Good, 1953; Anevski et al., 2013), but we are going to ignore this problem.
The ‘κ-method’ of Brenner (Brenner, 2010) is based on an analogous line of reason-
ing. It estimates the likelihood ratio as L̂rκ = N
2
N−N1 . However, in the derivation of this
estimator, there is an approximation involved, based on assumptions which are not always
satisfied, leading sometimes to anti-conservatism (see also the discussion in Buckleton
et al. (2011), and the answer in Brenner (2014)). In particular, Brenner (2014) provides a
pathological population where the approximation does not hold, while showing empirical
evidence that for Fisher-Wright populations the condition is fulfilled. Our method is, on
the other hand, based on a principled derivation of the estimator of equation (8), which is
similar to Brenner’s one under the following conditions: there are almost only singletons
and doubletons in the database, and N1  N2. These assumptions are typically satisfied,
explaining why Brenner’s method often works. They also constitute a good description of
when it does not work.
Lastly, we remark that this method can be generalized in the obvious way, to the case
in which the haplotype is indeed in the database. Moreover, this method is suitable to be
directly applied to different kinds of evidence.
7.1 Quantifying the uncertainty of the GG method
As we did in Section 6.2, we want to quantify the uncertainty of this method. One way is
to compare the distribution of
̂log10 LrGG = log10
NN1
2N2
,
with the distribution of the “true”
log10 LrGG = log10
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN )
Pr (YN+1 /∈ YN ∩ YN+1 = YN+2) := log10
θ1
θ2
.
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Actually, the latter is not a distribution, but a single value, unknown. Again, we pre-
tend that the database of Purps et al. (2014) contains the profiles of the whole population,
to find out the ‘true’ θ1 and θ2, restricting our simulations to 7 loci. To do so, we sample
M small databases of size N = 100, along with two other haplotypes. θ1 is the proportion
of times in which the (N + 1)st haplotype is a new one (i.e., not one of the previous N),
and θ2 is the proportion of times in which the (N + 2)nd is equal to the (N + 1)st, and
different from the first N observations. From our simulations, we used M = 100, 000, and
we obtained θ1, θ2, and log10 Lr as in Table 2.
θ1 θ2 True log10 LrGG
0.748 0.0012 2.78
Table 2: Values of θ1 and θ2 and of log10 LrGG obtained by simulations, assuming that the
database of Purps et al. (2014) contains the whole population of interest.
The distribution of ̂log10 LrGG = log10 NN12N2 can be obtained by sampling M = 100, 000
databases of size N = 100. Out of 100,000 databases, 121 had N2 = 0. They have
been removed from the data, and we acknowledge that this choice creates unfairness to
the discrete Laplace method. On the other hand, we believe that this occurs frequently
enough not to affect very strongly the comparison.
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Figure 3: Boxplots of the distribution of ̂log10 LrGG around the true value log10 LrGG
(black line).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the estimator ̂log10 LrGG around the true value
(black line). The error of the Generalized-Good method, defined as eGG = ̂log10 LrGG −
log10 LrGG, tells us how much the estimator differs from the true value.
Table 3 provides the summaries for ̂log10 LrGG, and for the error eDL. We don’t provide
the plots for the distribution of eGG since they are identical to those in Figure 3, shifted
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Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max sd
log10 LrGG 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 0
̂log10 LrGG 2.215 2.682 2.792 2.818 2.920 3.668 0.198
Error eGG -0.566 -0.098 0.0112 0.038 0.14 0.887 0.198
Table 3: Summaries of the distribution of ̂log10 LrGG, of log10 LrGG, and of the error eGG.
of log10 LrGG.
One can see that the error can attain up to about 0.9 orders of magnitude. The
distribution of the error is mostly located on the positive values, which means that, more
often than not, ̂log10 LrGG overestimates log10 LrGG. The standard deviation of the error
is small, thereby eGG does not move too much away from the mean, which is about 0.038.
If compared to the error of the discrete Laplace method, one can conclude that here we
get a better estimator in terms of accuracy, since the error ranges over more restrained
values and the standard deviation is much smaller. However, it is important to keep in
mind that they are not different estimators of the same quantity, but different estimators
of different quantities, since the reduction of data used by the Generalized-Good method,
which allows obtaining accuracy in the estimates is less strong to discern between the two
hypotheses.
8 Choosing and comparing methods
In comparing the two methods one can consider the precision with respect to what the
method is trying to estimate, quantified by the errors eDL, and eGG. These errors are
due to the two second and third level of uncertainty described in Section 4, and decrease
sensibly if data is reduced. This is why, under this aspect, the Generalized-Good is to
be preferred to the discrete Laplace, and for the latter a fewer number of loci is to be
preferred. However, it is not correct to believe that the greater the reduction, the better
is the method. To reduce means to lose information, and thus to diminish the capability
of the method to distinguish between the hypotheses at stake (the first, or basic level
of uncertainty). In order to investigate this loss, one can compare each method to the
likelihood ratio 1/f (where f is the population frequency of the matching haplotype),
which can be considered the hallmark in a population with no substructure. Comparing
Table 1 with Table 2 one can see for instance that choosing the Generalized-Good one loses
on average around 0.5 (in logarithmic scale) in terms of strength of data to discriminate
between hypotheses. This is a small disadvantage for the prosecution, while everybody
gain in terms of precision with respect to the true log10 LrGG. As a last remark, we invite
the reader to realize that the discrete Laplace method is better inasmuch it can always be
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used. On the other hand, for the Generalized-Good, we had to remove 121 experiments
where N2 = 0.
9 Remark and conclusion
The aim of this paper could, at first sight, be considered that of offering two additional
frequentist methods to address the issue of the likelihood ratio calculation in the case of
a rare Y-STR haplotype match. However, a careful reader may have realized that these
methods also constitute two interesting opportunities to show and apply the guidelines
exposed in the opening sections. In particular, two important facts are pointed out in
Sections 3 and 4: first, it is more sensible to talk about “a” likelihood ratio instead of
“the” likelihood ratio, and second, a quantification of the error involved in the estimation
is to be provided along with the estimate of the likelihood ratio.
Moreover, it is explained that sometimes it is possible to the break down the data to
be evaluated into E (which is sufficient for H) and B (which is irrelevant for H). The
discrete Laplace method (developed in Section 6) is a good example where this distinction
can be done, while the same is not true for the Generalized-Good method (Section 7).
Lastly, this paper wants to get across the message that reducing the data to a smaller
extent is sometimes not only necessary, but also desirable in terms of exactitude of the esti-
mates, as proved by the comparison between the discrete Laplace method (less reduction,
less precision of the estimates) and the Generalized-Good method (stronger reduction,
more precision of the estimates). In this respect we disagree with Buckleton et al. (2011)
who, talking about Brenner’s method, state that ‘there is a merit focussing in the type
or name of a lineage marker”. Although we agree that “such ignorance of type implies a
substantial loss of information”, it may allow a large gain in precision.
The take home message is that choosing the best method is clearly a very delicate task.
One has to consider many different aspects, and look for a compromise which is acceptable
for the specific application at hand. It is important to realise that in this paper we study
a very extreme situation with very small databases and a possibly unrealistic population,
for which the Generalized-Good seemed to be the best compromise. Clearly, there are
no possible general conclusions to be given, other than at each new situation one has to
reconsider all these aspects, and weigh them.
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